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The Global Reach of EU Law and Brexit: Between Theory and Praxis? 
Elaine Fahey* 
 
The essence of the phenomenon of the global reach of EU law is that the laws, rules and standards 
governing the single market constitute homogenous forms of regulation for a vast range of subject 
areas, governing a bloc of half a billion consumers and traders, are sufficiently desirable that many third 
countries adopt them as takers. Alternatively, traders, businesses, companies, associations, countries 
receive them or are subjected to them, compelled to or otherwise. The paper argues that a significantly 
overlooked point as to the future of the UK in the Brexit negotiations with the EU is that, irrespective of 
the outcome of the negotiations, the UK will inevitably become subject to this phenomenon. 
 
Overview 
Where does a country get its laws and rules from in a globalised world? In order to trade, cooperate, 
allow airplanes into one’s airspace, goods to cross your borders, parts to circulate within a supply chain, 
there needs to be a certain level of international standards, rules and cooperation that cannot be solely 
within the purview of the Nation State. The development of autonomous standards is expensive, time-
consuming and requires considerable scientific and technical expertise. It also relates to a vast range 
of activities outside of one’s territory. The rise of the ‘America First’ Trump campaign and ‘Brexit Britain’ 
has seen a specific form of engagement with globalisation, rooted in particular views of sovereignty and 
a firm view of the ability of the nation state to shape and fashion globalisation within its own territories. 
Its complex relationship with the reality of global commerce, markets across borders, complex supply 
chains and increasingly sophisticated consumers seeking out transbordered activities, products and 
services is a murky morass to unpack. It is even more complex for the UK to leave the world’s largest 
trading block in its Brexit in the hope of becoming ‘Global Britain’.1 
This paper seeks to unpack the significance of the phenomena of the Global Reach of EU law and its 
practical operation and inevitability for the UK Brexit negotiations as it becomes a ‘rule taker’ in the 
global legal order through its own laws. It focuses upon the Global Reach of EU law as a well-
documented scientific phenomenon across subjects, disciplines and jurisdictions largely relating to the 
EU’s internal market but increasingly pertaining to a broad range of other policies in various ways. As 
will be outlined, it denotes how a significant number of third countries take, receive and or are subjected 
to EU law. EU laws, rules and standards, from space to the regulation of wine, increasingly propose to 
‘set’ international standards or incorporate international standards, and also, increasingly vice versa. 
The paper argues that a significantly overlooked point as to the future of the UK in the Brexit negotiations 
with the EU is that, irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations being a hard or soft Brexit or any 
other formulation thereof,2 in reality the UK will inevitably become subject to what is referred to as the 
Global Reach of EU Law. A less sophisticated but succinct synopsis of the argument might be that: ‘you 
can run but you cannot hide from EU law’.  
The negotiation stance of the UK on Brexit has moved arguable swiftly to the aspiration of ‘Global 
Britain’ without engaging much in the specifics of how this is possible eg the state of global governance 
or the current malaise of the WTO etc. What may be beneficial at this point in time of the UK-EU 
negotiations is to attempt to reflect upon the Global Reach of EU law for the meaning of ‘global Britain’ 
going forward and its capacity to interact with the EU and global governance in turn. 3  Hard or soft 
                                                      
* Dr Elaine Fahey is Reader in Law and Associate Dean (International) at the Institute for the Study of European 
Law (ISEL), the City Law School, City University London.  
1 Speech by Prime Minister Theresa May, Lancaster House, 17 January 2017. 
2 Eg ‘Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership’ (29 August 2016), 
<http://bruegel.org/2016/08/europe-after-brexit-a-proposal-for-a-continental-partnership/>, JHH Weiler, ‘Editorial: 
The Case for a Kinder, Gentler Brexit’ European Journal of International Law (6 February 2017) 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/editorial-the-case-for-a-kinder-gentler-brexit/>; Thomas Streinz,  ‘Cooperative Brexit: 
Giving back control over trade policy’ (2017) 15 (2)  I-CON 271. 
3 European Commission website, ‘Brexit negotiations The Article 50 negotiation process and principles for the 
United Kingdom's departure from the European Union,’ 
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Brexit, the UK faces a significant loss of influence and input into the EU trading bloc governing less than 
half a billion people and consumers, in the short-term at least. It is probably doubtful that all UK business 
trading with the EU will voluntarily and unilaterally decide or want to stop circulating their products, look 
for entirely new markets, new consumers to replace all 440 million remaining EU consumers, stop global 
supply chains, cease contracts and services etc on ‘Brexit day’. On the contrary, it appears reasonable 
to assert that all or a significant proportion of UK businesses, firms, companies doing business in the 
EU on Brexit day will want to continue as usual with their European counterparts, as much as possible. 
All businesses in the UK appear to express this desire to some degree, most seeking to avoid a ‘cliff 
edge’.4 Opponents to this view will argue that Britain will become a global power, uninhibited by its 
current restraints as part of the EU. However, as Sands et all in the Harvard Business School study of 
‘Making Brexit Work for British Business’ state, a massive expansion of trade with non-EU countries is 
required for the ‘circle to be squared’ and replicate the statistics for current UK-EU trade.5 The Global 
Reach of EU law is thus likely to become an increasingly salient question.6 
The EU and UK have exchanged several policy papers in summer 2017, including future partnership 
policy papers, and the overall negotiating intent of the UK still remains far from clear-cut. A ‘Repeal Bill’, 
now formally a UK European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, is the UK’s legislative proposal to deal with 
the legal and regulatory vacuum of Brexit and is going through Parliament at the time of writing.7 
However, its core formula is argued here to be deficient for its failure to engage with the operation of 
the Global Reach of EU law. Instead, it is argued that it could be formulated with much more 
sophistication and dynamism in order to reflect the reality of the Global Reach of EU law that the UK 
will inevitably face outside of the EU, although the paper will limit itself to developing ‘global reach’ and 
its salience, generally and specifically as it relates overall to the Bill.  
This paper examines in the first section the phenomenon of the Global Reach of EU law generally. The 
second section reflects upon the UK becoming an object of EU law and a ‘rule-taker’ as a matter of law 
and governance in broader thematic terms. The third section examines the UK European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill 2017 as to the specifics of the form of Brexit, followed by Conclusions. 
The Global Reach of EU law 
The phrase ‘global reach’ has long had connotations of ‘world reach, success or influence’, in a 
commercial context. Understandings of the ‘reach’ of law ‘globally’ conventionally have had a high 
Anglo-American rather than European content and relate predominantly to the extra-territoriality of US 
law.8 This state of affairs, however, has radically changed in recent times. The global reach of EU law 
nowadays denotes a variety of situations where the EU acts as a ‘rule-exporter’ to many countries, 
organisations and associations and gives its rules or compels others to take them, setting high 
standards or cohesive standards for a block of half a billion consumers, traders and enterprises and so 
on.  
The Global Reach of EU law is charted in literature over several decades and is distinctively developed 
often by US and Swiss-based authors as much as from EU-based authors/ scholars across a range of 
                                                      
  <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations_en>. For the negotiation documents and joint statements: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations/negotiating-documents-article-50-negotiations-united-
kingdom_en> last accessed 28 July 2017. 
4 Peter Sands, Ed Balls, Sebastian Leape, Nyasha Weinberg, ‘Making Brexit work for British Business: Key 
Execution Priorities’ Harvard Kennedy School Study M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 77 (2017), mirroring 
much UK and EU Scholarship and official trade statistics: see ‘UK in a Changing EU’ research papers series, as a 
primary source of independent academic interdisciplinary Brexit research http://ukandeu.ac.uk/research-papers/ 
last accessed 28 July 2017. 
5 ibid.  
6 See LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe, ‘Britain as a Global Actor after Brexit’ 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/Hearing-7---Britain-as-a-Global-actor-after-BREXIT-
REPORT.pdf> last accessed 28 July 2017. 
7 ‘The Repeal Bill: White Paper’ (30 March 2017); European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017; European 
Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 (HC Bill 5). See the discussion of ‘UK-EU Future Partnership Policy Papers’ below 
in Section III.  
8 For example, a search on Westlaw International generates thousands of hits, predominantly from US journals. 
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disciplines rendering it a rich field of global thought.9  Its development by authors outside of the EU in 
its analysis often of third countries also has the advantage of bringing added global value as ‘external 
thought’ or ‘thinking’ to current debates. Thus, the global reach of EU law through rule-transfer thus 
denotes how the EU has adopted rules and standards governing half a billion citizens, traders, business, 
companies, markets, across a range of subject areas, that other polities, markets and businesses have 
in turn adopted, compelled to do so or acting out of sheer necessity. The essence of the phenomenon 
of the global reach of EU law is that the laws, rules and standards governing the single market constitute 
homogenous forms of regulation for a vast range of subject areas governing a bloc of half a billion 
consumers and traders are sufficiently desirable that many third countries adopt them as takers; 
alternatively, traders, businesses, companies, associations, countries receive them or are subjected to 
them, compelled to or otherwise.  
Thus, the global reach of EU law encompasses the perceived ‘spillover’ effect of EU regulatory 
standards on US rules in the realm of, inter alia, genetically modified foods, data privacy standards and 
chemical safety rules (‘The so-called Brussels Effect’);10 the extent to which EU legal rules are actually 
transplanted in the US: for example, the transposition of EU environmental standards in California, 
Boston and Maine (‘From Brussels with Love’),11 the incorporation of EU vehicle emissions standards 
into Chinese and Japanese law,12 EU makeup standards in Malaysia and innovative transfers of policies 
from the EU to the US in socio-economic fields of law.13 It also spans the internationalisation of EU law 
and Europeanisation of international law as a phenomenon in non-economic fields of law, as much as 
technical and administrative procedures and standards in, for example, environmental and food law.14 
The size and scale of the EU, as a market and as a polity, governing half a billion people and 
businesses, has thus generated what is understood in more specific terms as ‘rule-transfer’.15  The 
process of the outwards adoption of EU rules elsewhere is referred to as ‘rule-transfer’, ‘sideways rule-
transfer’ or ‘rule-migration’.16 Some draw a distinction between the EU’s transfer of legal rules and 
governance practices externally, for example, the EU’s uploading of its governance to the UN 
Convention on Disabilities.17 Additionally, there is a body of non-legal scholarship describing the 
diffusion of values specifically from the EU to the US legal order across legal fields, notably in data 
protection and data privacy, not understood as rule-transfer but clearly linked thereto.18 Moreover, from 
                                                      
9 A Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1;  A Young, ‘The European 
Union as a global regulator? Context and comparison’ (2015) 22(9) Journal of European Public Policy 1233; J 
Scott, ‘From Brussels with Love: the Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory 
Attraction’ (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 897; E Fahey, The Global Reach of EU Law 
(Routledge, 2016). 
10 ibid, Young; Bradford. 
11 See Scott (n 10).  
12 M Rousselin, ‘But why would they do that? European External Governance and the Domestic Preferences of 
Rule Importers’ (2012)  Journal of Contemporary European Research 470. 
13 Eg  K Linos, The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How Health, Family, and Employment Laws Spread 
Across Countries (OUP 2013). 
14 Fahey (n 10); J Mendes, ‘EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes: Hollowing Out Procedural Standards?’ (2012) 
10(4) I-CON I 988. 
15 See S Lavenex and F Schimmelfennig, ‘EU rules beyond borders: theorizing external governance in European 
politics’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy 791; S Lavenex and F Schimmelfennig, (eds) Democracy 
Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance? (London: Routledge, 2012). 
16 Bradford; Scott; Fahey (n 10). 
17 G De Búrca, ‘The European Union in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’ (2010) 35 European Law 
Review 174. 
18 M Pollack and G Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified 
Foods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009);  D Bach and A Newman, ‘Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the 
Shadow of Public Power: Resolving digital dilemmas in Europe and the United States’ (2004) Governance 387 ; W 
Rees and R Aldrich, ‘European and US Approaches to Counterterrorism’ in R Tiersky and E Jones (eds), Europe 
Today: A Twenty-First Century Introduction (3rd ed, Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 437; G Shaffer, ‘Globalisation 
and social protection: the impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting up of US Data Privacy Standards’ 
(2000) Yale Journal of International Law 1. 
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areas as diverse as the internal market,19 EU refugee law,20 data protection,21 EU environmental law, 
EU banking and financial services and taxation law,22 fundamental rights, to EU competition law,23 it is 
now perceived as a commonplace occurrence of EU law that it has global reach through novel forms of 
extra-territoriality. This state of affairs seems poised to become of greater salience in the future of UK-
EU relations. All forms thereof are broadly accepted to depict the phenomenon of the Global Reach of 
EU law. The Global Reach of EU law is thus far from a mere theoretical idea. Importantly, it also relates 
to a body of literature on the EU as a ‘soft power’ and good global actor, evolving to promote its values 
and norms initially through its trade policy, immortalised in the early work of Ian Manners ‘Normative 
Power Europe’.24 It emphasises the soft behind the scenes diplomacy of a large trading bloc.  
The reach of EU law is not merely unidirectional from a predominantly economic perspective but also 
‘cuts the other way,’ from an administrative and procedural perspective and puts an increasing range 
of obligations on the EU. For example, Article 11(3) Treaty on the European Union (TEU) provides that 
the Commission is obliged to consult in its rule-making with ‘the parties concerned’, largely understood 
to encompass stakeholders irrespective of their country of origin. There are many new obligations under 
EU law to initiate coordination or to monitor third country conditions and many EU Administrative 
decisions are also addressed to individuals or legal persons in third countries, eg relating to various 
administrative procedures in environmental law, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions.25 Recent research also suggests that the EU 
and US in particularly have become increasingly open to the view of stakeholders and third parties as 
they evolve their regulatory reach in the world.26 These developments will arguably ensure that the UK 
will have a voice in EU law and governance irrespective of the institutional set-up reached, albeit that it 
falls well below membership and traverses many domains.  
EU policy has also expressly sought to seek regulatory convergence in its Global Europe policy and to 
push tackling complex regulatory issues as a key condition of advancing the EU’s global trade agenda.27 
However, EU global reach may thus logically appear to imply rule exportation but the position is not so 
straightforward. With respect to actual EU trade partners (ie third countries with trade agreements with 
the EU) the picture as to the global reach of EU law is far more nuanced. In a study of four of the EU’s 
New Generation Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) (i.e. Canada, Central America, Singapore and 
South Korea), it has been shown, by a leading political economy scholar, how there is no evidence of 
the EU exporting its rules to its partners with respect to technical barriers to trade, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, domestic regulation of financial services, competition policy, data protection, 
environmental protection, labour standards.28 Instead, the EU’s regulatory influence appears to vary in 
line with the power of its partner. Agreement to reduce existing regulatory differences is rare and 
whether it does exist, regulatory coordination through convergence or the acceptance of equivalence 
occurs, often implying no real change. In cases of convergence, the partner appears to move towards 
the EU’s position.29 This is also a point of much significance when considering the so-called ‘Repeal 
                                                      
19 M Cremona, ‘The European Union as a global actor: Roles, models and identity’ (2004) Common Market Law 
Review 553; Bradford, (n 10); P Eeckhout, The European Internal Market and International Trade – A Legal 
Analysis (OUP 1994); Fahey (n 10) 
20 For example, H Lambert, J McAdam and M Fullerton (eds), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law (CUP 
2013). 
21 On the territorial scope of the General Data Protection Regulation: Cedric Ryngaert ‘Symposium issue on 
extraterritoriality and EU data protection (2015) 5(4) International Data Privacy Law 221. 
22 S Kingston, ‘Territoriality in EU (Taxation) Law: A Sacred Principle, or Dépassé?’ in J Englisch (ed), International 
Tax Law and New Challenges from Constitutional and Legal Pluralism (IBFD 2015). 
23 See F Wagner-von Papp ‘Competition law, Extra-territoriality and Bilateral Agreements’ in A Ezrachi (ed), 
Research Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012). 
24 I Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' (2002) Journal of Common Market Studies 235 
25 Eg E Korkeo-aho, ‘Evolution of the role of third countries in EU law- towards full legal subjectivity?’ Ch 11; I. 
Vianello, ‘From objects to subjects: paving the way for third countries and their natural and legal persons’ Ch 12 in 
in S Bardutzky and E Fahey (eds) Framing the Subjects and Objects of Contemporary EU law (Edward Elgar 2017). 
26 Eg A Berman, ‘Taking foreign interests into account: Rulemaking in the US and EU’ (2017) 15(1) I-CON 235. 
27 European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the World (2006) 
28 A Young, ‘Liberalizing trade, not exporting rules: the limits to regulatory co-ordination in the EU's ‘new generation’ 
preferential trade agreements’ (2015) 22(9) Journal of European Public Policy 1253. 
29 ibid. 
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Bill’ formula, discussed below and appears to indicate that the UK will need to both retain retrospectively 
and prospectively considerable amounts of EU law in order to trade with it.  
The next section reflects upon the broader themes of framing the UK in the global legal order in law 
and governance, prior to looking more specifically at its internal manifestations in Brexit. 
 
Framing Shifts in The UK in Forms of Law and Global Governance  
In Law: From Subject to Object of EU law 
A central point of the EU legal order has been to distinguish its legal order from public international law, 
as one where the subjects are individuals along with the Member States, and thus not limited to Member 
States.30 The subjects/objects dichotomy is increasingly under pressure as the EU legal order evolves 
in the global context, with an ever-rising number of interests and actors and more powers cross-cutting 
internal and external fields.31 Post-Brexit, the UK will become formally an object of EU law, and will no 
longer be technically a subject of EU law. One may ask: Going from being a subject to object of EU law 
– is it really such a change? A distinction between subjects and objects of EU law can also be argued 
to be a very formalistic one when the scope and content of the Global Reach of EU law is reflected 
upon.32 There is possibly little difference between being a subject of EU law and becoming an object of 
EU law where the aspirant state seeks a ‘deep and special partnership’ of any form.33  This is because 
the global reach of EU law has had a tremendous impact upon the internal/external nexus of EU law, 
upon its fluidity, its territory and its regulatory scope. It provides a means to appreciate the nuances of 
the global reach of EU law and the UK’s shift going forward, which will perhaps be more dynamic than 
static and unprecedented.  
A more concrete example of the challenges of this shift might be evident from a practical example of a 
recent EU trade agreement.  Given the expressed desire in the UK for a ‘deep and special partnership’ 
with the EU, it is worth reflecting upon its meaning from the perspective of the global reach of EU law 
in light of compliance and rule-transfer with existing third country partners. The EU-Canada Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) has been heralded as the best, most ambitious and the most progressive 
form of trade agreement by leading European Union actors that the EU has ever concluded.34 It is high 
praise indeed for a legal agreement, given the broad range of EU agreements under negotiation or 
concluded in the post-Lisbon period with, inter alia, Singapore, South Korea, Columbia Peru, Georgia, 
India, Malaysia, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam, covering a diverse range of areas and fields, including 
controversial ones such as investment.  
CETA provides for the free movement of goods, persons and capital to various degrees and its depth 
and breadth remain to be seen, as a high profile next generation ‘WTO plus’ Agreement, which features 
provisions on science, education, justice, the environment and sustainability.35 It provides for detailed 
principles as to regulatory cooperation, in Chapter 21 thereof. While its Joint Interpretive Instrument 
expresses much sympathy towards the right to regulate and the voluntary nature of EU-Canada 
regulatory cooperation,36 Commissioner Malmstrom emphasized that after CETA’s notorious ‘legal 
                                                      
30  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
31 Fahey and Bardutzky, (n 26) Ch 1 
32 ibid. 
33 T May, ‘Article 50 Notification Letter from the UK to President Tusk’ (29 March 2017). 
34  See generally <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_en.htm>. See such descriptions in many 
press releases and EU official briefings on CETA: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1570> (eg 
EU Council president, or from EU Commissioner for Trade). See Council Decision (EU) 2017/37 of 28 October 
2016 on the signing on behalf of the European Union of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part OJ L 
11, 14.1.2017, p. 1–2; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, 
and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part OJ L 11, 14.1.2017, p 23–1079 
35 E Fahey, ‘CETA and Global Governance’ (2017) 2(1) European Papers, European Forum, Insight of 9 February 
2017. 
36 Council, Joint Interpretive Instrument between the EU, Canada and its Member States 13541/16 (27 October 
2016).  
I r i s h  J o u r n a l  o f  E u r o p e a n  L a w   V o l u m e  2 0  I s s u e  1  
21 
[2017] 20 (1) IJEL 
 
scrubbing’: ‘… let me underline that CETA does not change EU standards and regulations on consumer 
safety, product safety, consumer protection, health, environment or labour provisions in any way. 
Imports from Canada must comply with EU product rules in full – no exceptions….’37 It is an important 
statement of the reality of the nature of compliance to be required in order to trade with the EU in a 
Next-Generation Agreement and the difficult relationship between subject and object that the UK has 
yet to engage with. This leads to the question of framing the UK in the global governance terms. 
In Global Governance: From ‘Rule-Maker’ to ‘Rule-Taker’ 
It is striking that the UK in its Brexit process is widely understood to become a ‘rule-taker’ and not a 
‘rule-maker’. 38 This results from the view that a mid-sized Nation State with, inter alia, limited native 
industry and high levels of food imports, will have difficulty in reinventing the wheel in creating the 
economic and technical conditions for widespread adoption of its rules. The lexicon of ‘rule-makers’ and 
‘rule-takers’ comprises a vast multidisciplinary literature, which depicts the development of global power 
and standard-setting. It is a literature which in contemporary times is mainly focussed upon Brazil, 
China, India and Mexico, working within the global legal order as a system of rules evolved from the so-
called post-Washington Consensus as to markets and the regulatory state.39 It focusses upon the 
genesis of legal rules and the ability of a legal order to project its rules upon the global legal order or a 
specific constituency thereof- or merely comply therewith. The terminology implies a significant power 
difference or differential or gap between the ‘maker’ and ‘taker’. A ‘rule-taker’ is considered universally 
to be an adverse state of affairs where the power dynamic puts the rule-taker at a position of less 
influence, authority and significance than the ‘rule-maker’, a point only tacitly raised to date in most UK 
debates. The so-called ‘Empire 2.0 logic’ argues that the Commonwealth nations can become the UK’s 
new main market, dominated by its shared common law legal systems, language and shared norms 
and customs, to certain degrees.40 This, however, would require the UK to be at the heart of and leading 
a new legal order of global significance, currently some distance from the status quo. Initial talks at the 
time of writing between the UK and other commonwealth countries suggest that there is some distance 
to go.  
The final section reflects upon the legislation proposed recently by the UK Government to implement 
Brexit internally, and upon how this relates to the Global Reach of EU Law.  
 
The UK Position and Policy Papers and European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017: Becoming Rule-
Taker? 
It is argued here that a legal and political irony of Brexit continues to be its logic to ‘take back control’ 
largely because the Global Reach of EU law will probably result in its evolution from rule-maker to ‘rule-
taker.’ The UK in its policy papers on a future UK-EU partnership in a range of areas exchanged with 
the EU in summer 2017 demonstrates this amply in broader terms. It seeks to maintain significant 
amounts of EU norms both retrospectively and prospectively, and thus the status quo substantively in 
most of the future partnership policy papers, from data, science, civil justice cooperation and even in 
foreign policy.41  For example, in the future partnership paper, ‘the exchange and protection of personal 
data’, the paper outlines how…’the UK will be compliant with EU data protection law… on exit’, whereby 
a UK-EU model for exchanging and protecting personal data could build on the existing adequacy 
                                                      
37 C Malmstrom, ‘CETA Legal Revision Done’ (4 March 2016), 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/ceta-legal-revision-done_bg> 
accessed 28 July 2017. 
38 Financial Times ‘UK Becomes Rule-Taker’ (30 March 2017) <http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2017/03/30/from-
rule-maker-to-rule-taker/?mhq5j=e1> accessed 28 July 2017. 
39 See Rousselin; (n 13); Wolfgang Alschner and Dmitriy Skougarevskiy ‘Rule Takers or Rule Makers’ (2016) A 
new look at African bilateral investment treaty practice NCCR Working Papers; S Kennedy & S Cheng, ‘From Rule 
Takers to Rule Makers the Growing Role of Chinese in Global Governance’ (2012) 
40Eg J Blitz, ‘Post-Brexit Delusions about Empire 2.0 logic’ Financial Times (7 March 2017),  
<https://www.ft.com/content/bc29987e-034e-11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9> accessed 28 July 2017. 
41 Department for Exiting the European Union and The Rt Hon David Davis MP, Future Partnership Position Papers 
(2017). 
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model.42 In the paper on ‘Foreign policy, defence and development’, it provides for a future partnership 
of unprecedented breadth, taking in cooperation on foreign policy, defence and security.43 In the paper, 
‘Collaboration on science and innovation’, it outlines the position of close regulatory alignment and the 
desire to seek to agree a continued system for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications.44 
Moreover, in its paper, ‘Providing a cross—border civil judicial cooperation framework’, it provides for 
the UK reflecting closely the substantive principles of cooperation under the EU framework and outlines 
the future incorporation into domestic law of the Rome I and II instruments as an intention.45 While not 
an exhaustive summary, the range of areas and broad thrust of the tentative policy goals expressed 
suggest an extremely high level of cooperation predicated upon incorporation and synchronization of 
rules and standards.  
This role of rule-taker has further become apparent in its emerging legislative form in UK law. Thus, in 
the publication of a White Paper in February 2017, The United Kingdom’s exit from the and new 
partnership outlined in European Union,46 a proposal was made for a so-called ‘Great Repeal Bill’ to 
remove the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972 from the statute book and convert the acquis, the 
body of EU law into domestic law. It provided that, wherever practical and appropriate, the same rules 
and laws would apply on the day after the UK left the EU as they did before. A further White Paper from 
the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU presented on how a Great Repeal bill would do so.47 It provided 
that it would repeal the ECA and return power to UK institutions. It would convert EU law at the moment 
of exit into UK law.48 ‘The Great Repeal Bill’ was to be legislation of fundamental constitutional 
significance because it is a proposal to paradoxically ‘cut-off’ a prolific course of law, preserve that 
source of law and provide for its future preservation, using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ framework.49 The Bill thus 
had the intention to repeal the ECA and to preserve EU law retrospectively. Prior to the date of its 
enactment, the existing EU law and related jurisprudence will be binding upon British courts but not 
thereafter. As a grand act, it purported to freeze in time all such laws but without knowing how many 
there are precisely as it subject and objects. It then purported to give significant secondary legislation 
powers to the Executive in order to cope with the influx of law-making. The Queens Speech of 21 June 
2017 is a remarkable fate for the Bill, from a significantly weakened Executive since its February 
development.50 In the Queens Speech, the word ‘Great’ had been removed from the Bill. 
The Bill published in July 2017 still proposes to repeal the ECA and convert all EU law into UK law as 
previously outlined, using a formula of ‘retained EU law’ in clause 6 and 6(7) thereof.51 It raises a broad 
range of technical and normative issues which are mostly not considered here. Nevertheless, in general, 
it may be argued that the so-called ‘Repeal Bill’ is illusory in order to ‘take back control’ in a world of 
globalisation. The necessity to adopt standards which have global significance or impact is seen by 
many to be incontrovertible in order to trade globally. This element of Brexit might be seen as quite 
inexplicable when seen in light of its ‘taking back control’ agenda. It may also be viewed as highly 
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undemocratic because it expressly commits the UK to becoming a ‘rule-taker’. There are many 
deficiencies of becoming a passive ‘rule-taker’ from an active ‘rule-maker’, chief among them that the 
UK no longer gets to input into the rules which it will be subjected to, soft or hard Brexit, if it wishes to 
trade with a bloc of half a billion consumers and traders etc on its door step. The irony of the outcome 
may be that the Westminster Parliament will have far less control and input on its laws that it currently 
has, particularly in the case of a transition regime that seems unlikely to be swiftly entered/ exited.52  
The Bill thus purports to freeze EU law in time in the UK and preserve it, in some form of legal 
gymnastics exercises. Its attempt to freeze the content of an evolving subject, will ground UK law in 
subjects, fields and disciplines, which may readily alter or change, raising many rule of law concerns.53 
For example, the principle of supremacy applies to EU law pre-existing before exit but not changes to 
the underlying law thereafter (s. 5(3)), raising many difficult questions as to legal certainty and fairness. 
The Global Reach of EU law arguably also entails that the retrospective time-freeze approach adopted 
in UK law could become a highly artificial exercise, with only political appeal and with little substantive 
legal rationale, as the UK’s General Court judge has emphasised extra-judicially.54  
The impossibility of repeal of EU standards and rules is further a likely outcome of globalisation, not 
Brexit. As outlined above, the internationalisation of EU law and Europeanisation of International law 
are evolving scientific trends in a variety of fields, such that the UK will find difficult to escape 
therefrom.55 The UK also faces the veritable impossibility of repeal of many EU rules and standards.  
There is a significant danger that the Global Reach of EU Law is grossly underestimated and how it 
could become a punitive dimension of future political discourse. The Bill as a ‘repeal’ mechanism could 
thus become quite a misnomer, through its failure to capture the practical reality of the Global Reach of 
EU Law, necessitating the incorporation of EU law going forward in whatever form.  
 
Conclusion 
It has been argued here to be factually and legally misleading to overlook the significance of the Global 
Reach of EU law. It will become highly difficult for the UK, its traders and businesses to escape the 
single market and its reach.  The UK policy papers on a future partnership along with the formula of the 
EU Bill already demonstrate this amply. They unequivocally outline degrees of incorporation of EU 
standards and rules going forward, seeking EU standards and retaining much of the acquis, from the 
past and the future. It leads to an inevitability of norm importation as a rule-taker. It becomes inevitable 
that hard or soft Brexit, UK business, traders and companies, amongst others, will have to follow EU 
law in order to circulate UK products in the EU, to sell services, to meet safety requirements, to comply 
with international standards at the heart of a large number of EU rules. The formulation of the UK 
becoming a rule-taker post-Brexit is provided for in many contexts already in the aforementioned policy 
papers. They also outline a mere inevitability: it will become too complex, too costly, too inconvenient 
to attempt to procedure autonomous UK standards and pointless where they do not suffice to satisfy 
what is required for trading with a bloc of half a billion consumers, businesses and so forth, within the 
EU. To some extent, the failure to engage with the inevitability of the global reach of EU law indicates 
the ideological dogma behind Brexit, before rationality or (cold) market logic. There is still a need for 
more level-headed reflection upon the reality of becoming a rule-taker and norm importer.  
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